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Rastafarians and the Law - the Systematic Repression of Religious Freedom in America - Rastafarians and the Law |
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Written by JAB
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Tuesday, 21 December 1999 |
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Page 3 of 3
After careful review of the arguments, this Court finds that 9 G.C.A. Section 67.89 is inorganic, as applied to this case, violating the Organic Act of Guam and the RFRA. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, although declared unconstitutional in state and local jurisdictions, is still applicable to Guam because Guam is considered a federal instrumentality of the United States.
The Supreme Court in invalidating the RFRA in state jurisdictions, made no specific reference to the constitutionality of the act in federal jurisdictions. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997). Arguably, Federal jurisdiction are still subject to the application of the act because RFRA was invalidated under violation of the 14th Amendment Section 5 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Congress went beyond the scope of their power by impeding upon the state police power when it required that RFRA be applied at every level of government.
Because Congress continues to exercise plenary power over the territories and does not share that same balance of power with the states, the RFRA is still applicable to Guam. Under Article 1 Section 8 cl. 17 and Article IV Section 3 cl. 2 of the Constitution, Guam and other U.S. territories are subject to Congress's plenary power. Because ultimately, the federal government possesses full and complete legislative authority over Guam, Guam is thus considered a federal instrumentality. Furthermore, the act itself does not specifically state Guam is to be considered a state in reference to the application of the act. The RFRA, although declared unconstitutional in state jurisdictions, has been endorsed and held up in certain federal courts. Abordo v. Hawaii 902 F.Supp. 1220 (1995); Wisconsin v. Yoder 196 .2d 238 (1995); In Re Hodges 220 B.R. 386 (1998), United States v. Martinez 84 F.3d 1549 (1996).
The Organic Act also maintains that no statute shall be imposed on the People of Guam that infringes upon their free exercise right to practice religion. The act enables us to interpret our own local laws. Therefore, upon finding Congress intended to resurrect the compelling interest standard, and that Guam is a federal instrumentality for the purposes of RFRA, it is this Courts finding that under either the Organic Act of Guam or the RFRA, a law of general applicability that substantially burdens a persons ability to practice his religion, must demonstrate a compelling state interest to do so, and that the statute is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that purpose. The Court, consequently, must apply the two-fold analysis.
In this case, the statute prohibiting the importation of marijuana, does not pass the strict scrutiny analysis because the Government has not demonstrated a compelling state interest to deny Defendants right to the free exercise of his religion by using marijuana as a sacrament. The Government has not even alleged that the law address a compelling state interest. Only paramount governmental interests suffice to permit limitation upon the free exercise rights. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (1963), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526
(1972). The Supreme Court has found compelling governmental interest in maintaining the tax system, Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 109 S.Ct. 2136 (1989); preserving national security, Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828 (1971); ensuring public safety, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944); providing public education, Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra; and enforcing participation in the social security system, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051 (1982). Moreover, the law may infringe on a persons right only if it does so in the least restrictive way possible. The Government has not alleged or attempted to show the statute is the least restrictive means of carrying out its purpose.
The People assert the statute in question is one of general applicability and therefore may substantially burden the Defendants ability to practice his religion. This Court has found that the People must put forth a compelling interest prior to erecting such a burden, and finds that the People have failed to present one. Therefore this Court finds that, as applied in this case, the Guam statute violates the Organic Act and the RFRA.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that, as applied to the specific facts of this case, 9 G.C.A. Section 67.89 violates the Organic Act of Guam and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendants Motion to Dismiss.
SO ORDERED this 29 Day of July, 1999.
Michael J. Bordallo Judge, Superior Court of Guam
Benny T. Guerrero (Ras Iyah Ben Makahna 1997)
Declaration of Carl Olsen - July 14, 1999
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